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I. INTRODUCTION
"The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abun-
dance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those
who have too little."
-Franklin D. Roosevelt'
This Article examines the issues concerning the weight a Social Secur-
ity administrative law judge ("ALJ") must give to a "medically acceptable
treating source" as defined by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) and
416.927(d)(2). The review includes an overview of the Social Security 2 dis-
ability hearing process in order to provide the reader with a context to the
main discussion, an examination of the various issues pertaining to the
weight given to treating physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist opinions as
established by Congress in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) and 416.927(d)(2),
and the interpretations of those regulations by Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals judges and U.S. district court and magistrate judges in the Northern
and Southern Districts of Mississippi. Included will be information rele-
vant to ALJs, the attorney writers who assist ALJs in crafting their opin-
ions, and lawyers and representatives of claimants appearing before ALJs
in Social Security disability hearings brought under the auspices of Title II
and Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
Not included in this Article is a thorough discussion of the myriad of
other considerations allocated to ALJs and practicing attorneys in disabil-
ity cases, such as claimant credibility,3 the effect of obesity or pain4 on
1. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937).
2. The Social Security Administration is now an independent agency as of March 31, 1995, pur-
suant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2006), as noted in greater detail at 1 HARVEY L.
MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES § 1:9 (6th ed. 2006).
3. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2012) and SSR 9 6 - 7 p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996), detail how an
AU must consider the effect of pain in assessing RFC and whether objective evidence supports the
claimant's subjective complaints of pain. An "ALJ must consider subjective evidence of pain" and
make a finding on the claimant's credibility, "but it is within [the ALJ's] discretion to determine the
pain's disabling nature." Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curium). Although an
AL is bound to explain his reasons for rejecting a claimant's complaints of pain, he is not required to
follow "formalistic rules in his articulation." Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1994). The
AL's determination about credibility is entitled to great deference and will not be upset if supported
by substantial evidence. Woodham v. Astrue, No. 1:10CV308-SA-DAS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19330,
at *12-13 (N.D. Miss. January 31, 2012) (citing Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2000)). The
best discussion on these issues may be found in SSR 9 6 - 7 p.
4. For a good discussion of the Fifth Circuit's analysis of pain symptoms, see Hollis v. Bowen,
837 F.2d 1378, 1384 (5th Cir. 1988) and Adams v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1987).
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other impairments, and the relevance of alcohol and drug abuse to disabil-
ity and approval of attorney fee petitions. Other issues, such as the rele-
vance of substantial gainful activity ("SGA"), the application of
Impairment Listings, and the formulation of Residual Functional Capacity
("RFC"), are considered only where applicable to the central issues under
consideration herein.
II. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY HEARINGS BEFORE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
OF THE PROCESS
In Mississippi, Social Security Administration ALJs determines
whether claimants are disabled in three separate Offices of Disability, Ad-
judication, and Review ("ODAR") located in Tupelo, Jackson, and Hatties-
burg.6 ALJs handle appeals of denied claims from the components
responsible' for initial determinations and reconsiderations of claims.8 De-
cisions made by Mississippi ALJs are appealed to another Social Security
Administration component, the Appeals Council ("AC"), and from there,
to the appropriate U.S. District Court in the Northern or Southern District
of Mississippi (often handled there by agreement of the parties by United
States magistrate judges), and from there to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.9
In this Article, we will consider the two major types of cases ordinarily
associated with disability hearings: Title II Social Security Benefits and Ti-
tle XVI Supplemental Security Income Benefits. Actions under these titles
are governed by largely mirror regulations-Title II is governed by 20
C.F.R. Part 404, while Title XVI actions are governed by 20 C.F.R. Part
416.
Claimants eligible for Title II benefits include disabled workers who
have not reached full retirement age; retired insured workers aged sixty-
two and over and their spouses who are aged sixty-two or over or who are
caring for children either under sixteen or over sixteen but are disabled
5. ALJs also decide other issues, such as overpayments (whether claimants must return funds
overpaid them due to their return to work or recovery from disability), the paternity of children claim-
ing benefits based upon a potential parent's disability, and several other issues with which we are not
directly concerned here.
6. ALJs are sometimes called to handle cases in other offices in their own ODAR Region. In
my case, this is Region 4-essentially, Florida to Mississippi. This occurs when other offices, for various
reasons such as temporary attrition of judges, need visiting judges to help maintain ever-mounting
caseloads. In such circumstances, I have held hearings by video or in person (when claimants refuse to
waive in-person hearings) for offices in Covington and Augusta, Georgia, Panama City and Melbourne,
Florida, and Lexington and Louisville, Kentucky.
7. This refers to the state agency Department of Disability Services ("DDS"), which makes
initial and reconsideration determinations of disability, from which claimants appeal to ALJs, as noted
in greater detail at RICHARD C. RUSKELL, SOCIAL SECURIfY DISABILITY CLAIMs HANDBOOK, § 2:6
(2012). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503, 416.903 (2012).
8. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-28, 416.1400-28 (2012) for a full discussion of the procedures con-
cerning appeals to AUs from initial determinations and reconsideration determinations and subse-
quent Appeals Council and federal court review of AU decisions.
9. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §H 404.955, 416.1455 (2012).
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(thus entitling them to benefits on the worker's Social Security record);
certain divorced spouses of insured but retired, disabled, or deceased work-
ers; and certain minor dependents of insured but retired, disabled, or de-
ceased workers,' 0 although questions of insured status and quarters of
coverage are not the subject of this Article." Essentially, Title II covers
workers who have sufficient earnings during applicable quarters to qualify
for benefits.
Those eligible for benefits under Title XVI include those with limited
income and resources or those aged sixty-five or older who are either blind
or disabled, including adults and children.12 Essentially, Title XVI covers
adults and children who lack insured status or are dependents of those who
lack insured status but have very limited income and resources.
Claimants eligible for benefits under Titles II and XVI 3 who have
been denied recovery through initial and reconsidered Department of Dis-
ability Services ("DDS") determinations appeal to ALJs for consideration
of the merits of their claims in disability hearings under the auspices of the
ODAR branch of the Social Security Administration.
A. What are Social Security Disability Hearings?
In Mississippi, Social Security disability hearings before ALJs are held
in Jackson, Tupelo, and Hattiesburg. The ALJ is the decision maker, and
the claimant may either appear with an attorney or qualified representa-
tive, or the claimant may represent himself. A hearing monitor (e.g., court
reporter in all but name only) is always present, and the ALJ may have an
expert vocational consultant present if desired. While the ALJ may call a
medical expert to testify in person or by telephone or video ("VTC"), the
claimant can testify and may call fact or expert witnesses in support of his
or her claim. Evidence is ordinarily submitted by claimants' 4 or obtained
by the ALJs prior to the hearing and is contained in an electronic record
available to both the claimant and the ALJ prior to and during the hearing.
The hearing is inquisitorial and not adversarial,' 6 the ALJ and claimant's
10. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.301-84 (2012) for additional information concerning these matters.
11. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.110-46 (2012) for further discussion.
12. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.202-69 (2012) for a complete explanation of eligibility for these
benefits.
13. The onset of disability is generally from the date alleged by the claimant in Title II cases or
from the date the claimant filed his or her petition for disability in Title XVI cases, although this may
sometimes become a controverted issue involving alleged onset date, work history, and medical evi-
dence. For a full discussion of these issues, see SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249 (Jan. 1, 1983), Ivy v. Sullivan,
898 F.2d 1045, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990), and Mosley v. Astrue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169, at *9-10 (N.D.
Miss. Jan. 1, 2010) (Magistrate Judge Allan Alexander finding that the ALJ correctly rejected the treat-
ing doctor's findings because they were rendered prior to the alleged onset date).
14. Often, this is in the form of medical evidence from treating and examining medical sources
and statements by other witnesses such as employers, teachers, and family members.
15. Frequently, this is in the form of medical consultative examinations, answers to interrogato-
ries by medical experts, and employers' statements of wages earned and/or the claimant's capacity for
continued employment at that job.
16. See Bobo v. Astrue, No. 1:10CV00037-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114939, at *15 (N.D.
Miss. Oct. 27, 2010) (citing Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000)).
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attorney are charged with developing the evidence of record, and the ALJ
may question the claimant before or after the claimant or his or her repre-
sentative offers the claimant's direct testimony. Both the ALJ and claim-
ant are allowed to examine experts.
The hearing is not a formal trial, but neither is it so informal that fair-
ness and due process are not recognized. It is open to the parties and all
persons the ALJ deems necessary and proper, though not to the general
public. The ALJ will ordinarily render a decision subsequent to the hear-
ing, although ALJs may make an on-the-record favorable decision after the
introduction of the evidence and closing arguments by counsel. Hearings
are held in person or via VTC technology. ALJs in national hearing cen-
ters located throughout the country hold hearings only by VTC, allowing
them to reach claimants who would not otherwise be able to come to a
distant hearing office for a determination of their cases."
After collecting all relevant evidence and eliciting all relevant testi-
mony, the ALJ must perform a five-step sequential evaluation to deter-
mine whether or not the claimant is disabled.
B. The Sequential Nature of the Disability Evaluation:
The Five-Step Process
Social Security Administration regulations'" define "disability" as the
inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairmentl 9 that can be expected to re-
sult in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months.2 0 The sequential examination (ex-
plained here only in summary form to aid in the reader's understanding of
the issues presented) is a specific order of steps each ALJ must follow in
evaluating a disability claim. It is composed of five steps, although the pro-
cess may cease at any step when a finding of "disabled" or "not-disabled"
status can be made.2 '
Step one of the sequential evaluation asks, "Is/was the claimant engag-
ing in substantial gainful activity ("SGA")?2 2 If the claimant has SGA,23
then a finding of "not-disabled" may be made at step one.
17. See RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 3.10(b) for a more complete discussion of these procedures.
18. These are promulgated under § 223(d)(1)(A) and § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.
19. For an excellent discussion of the analysis an ALJ is required to use in determining the sever-
ity of a mental impairment (i.e., the "special technique" provided in the regulations), see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2012), ably discussed by Magistrate Judge John Roper, Sr., in Myers v. Astrue,
5:09CV121-DCB-JMR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142434, at * 37-38 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 18, 2010).
20. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a) (2012); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 155-156
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (giving an eloquent rendering of this definition and a warning against
the use of the term "severity" to allow premature dismissal of claims for lack of severity despite the
relatively expansive definition thereof).
21. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g) (2012) (a full discussion of the process); see also
Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2000) (the Fifth Circuit's affirmation of the requirement that
ALJs must abide by this evaluation process).
22. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510(a)-(b), 416.910(a)-(b) (2012); see also RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 2:8(a)
(thoroughly discussing SGA and its role in the sequential evaluation).
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Step two (a step of more direct concern to this Article) asks, "Does
the claimant have any severe medically determinable impairments?" 2 4 A
severe impairment is defined 25 as that which causes limitations having
more than a minimal effect on the claimant's capacity to perform basic
work activities.2 6 In other words, if an impairment such as degenerative
disk disease limits a claimant's ability to stand, walk, bend, breathe, etc. in
more than a minimal way, it is severe and the evaluation must proceed to
step three.
Step three asks, "Does the claimant have any impairment(s) that
meets or equals in medical severity a listing impairment(s)?" 2 7 In other
words, if the medical evidence alone documents an impairment or combi-
nation of impairments so medically severe as to be presumed disabling
(and more often than not, presumed permanently disabling or expected to
result in death), the evaluation stops and the claimant is declared disabled
without resort to a consideration of vocational factors. A listing of impair-
ments is located at Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, and these
include impairments severe enough to prevent a person from doing any
gainful activity and that affect one or more of the various body systems,
such as the cardiovascular, mental, digestive, and musculoskeletal sys-
tems.28 These regulations describe the severe impairments and extent of
limitations caused by them that must exist, as well as the clinical findings
and supporting tests required to demonstrate their existence in order to
qualify a claimant for disability based on the listings of impairments. How-
ever, should no listing be met or equaled, the evaluation must proceed to
step three-and-a-half. 29
23. Substantial gainful activity is defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972 (2012). Often, this
would constitute gross wages above a certain dollar amount in certain years (e.g., $1,000 per month in
2010 and $700 per month in 2000), although there are other factors to be considered, including available
work-related expenses and different standards for self-employment earnings, as noted in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1574(a), 404.1575, 404.1576 (2012), and other issues, none of which are directly relevant to this
Article.
24. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521, 404.1523, 416.920 (c), 416.921, 416.923 (2012).
25. See the landmark decision of Stone v Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), which
discusses and defines a severe impairment and which must always be cited in an AU opinion, rendered
in the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction, that finds impairments non-severe. The failure to cite Stone is grounds
for reversal.
26. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 404.1508, 416.905, 416.908 (2102); see also RUSKELL, supra note 7,
§ 2:15(a) (discussing severe impairments and the signs, symptoms, and medically acceptable clinical,
diagnostic, and laboratory findings essential to their determination).
27. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525, 416.925 (2012); see also Magee v. Astrue, 1:09CV620HSO-JMR, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33949, at *8-9 n.1 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2011) (District Judge Halil Suleyman
Ozerden's excellent statement of the analysis required to determine whether an impairment meets or
equals a listing).
28. 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; see also RusKELL, supra note 7, § 2.17(a).
29. Relatively few cases are decided at steps one through four, and the vast majority are decided
at step five. Major considerations at this final step often include the claimant's RFC, vocational consid-
erations pertinent to the RFC, the claimant's credibility, and the weight given to applicable medical
evidence, as noted below.
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Step three-and-a-half requires an unofficial, though nevertheless es-
sential determination; the ALJ must assess the claimant's residual func-
tional capacity ("RFC"). 3 0 RFC is the most that the claimant can do on a
sustained basis despite the limitations caused by his or her medically deter-
minable impairment(s).3 ' This is not the same as determining if the claim-
ant is disabled, but involves merely determining what types of work activity
the claimant can perform despite limitations caused by medically determi-
nable impairments.3 2 Work activities to be considered are exertional (i.e.,
how much the claimant can lift, how long he can sit or stand, and how much
he can push and pull) and non-exertional (i.e., the claimant's capacity to
bend, climb, crouch, concentrate, interact with others, and understand and
perform instructions of various degrees of difficulty).33 The above list of
activities is far from exhaustive but is sufficient to aid the understanding of
the reader at this juncture.3 4 Mental RFC includes an inquiry into the
claimant's ability to understand, remember, carry out instructions, and re-
spond adequately to supervisors, coworkers, the general public, and work
changes and pressures (stress).3 5 The RFC determined by the ALJ is uti-
lized in steps four and five, known as the vocational steps.
Step four asks, "Does the claimant's medically determinable impair-
ment(s) prevent the performance of past relevant work ("PRW")?"3 6
PRW is work performed within fifteen years of the adjudication or the date
last insured ("DLI") 37 for Title II cases when the DLI has expired at a level
constituting SGA.38 If the claimant has an RFC consistent with PRW, then
the evaluation ceases and the claimant is declared "not-disabled." If the
claimant establishes an impairment that precludes PRW, we proceed to the
next step.
The claimant has the burden of proof to demonstrate that he or she is
disabled at step four, but once the claimant has met the burden of showing
an inability to perform PRW, the burden of proof shifts to the Commis-
sioner, through the adjudicator, to prove that, despite the claimant's im-
pairments and functional limitations, there exist jobs in the national
economy that the claimant can perform.3 9 After the Commissioner meets
this burden, the burden of proof shifts again, back to the claimant to rebut
this finding.40
30. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945 (2012); see also RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 2:29 (discussing in
detail RFC and its relevancy to the hearing process including the sequential evaluation).
31. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
32. Id.
33. 20 C.F.R. 404.1567, 416.967.
34. Id.
35. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 2:29 (an additional discussion of
these activities and their relevance to the sequential evaluation).
36. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f) (2012).
37. A claimant is "insured" through a certain time for Title II purposes if he or she has worked
sufficient quarters within a certain period of time close enough to the date of adjudication.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 2:29; Chaparro v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 1008,1010 (5th Cir.
1987).
40. RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 2:7.
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Step five asks, "Does the claimant's impairment(s) prevent the per-
formance of other work which exists in significant numbers in the national
economy?"4 1 In making this determination, the ALJ considers the individ-
ual's age, education, and work experience to decide if there are a sufficient
number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform on a
sustained basis.4 2
The AU may be aided in this step, as he was in step four, by a voca-
tional expert 43 who testifies about the types and numbers of jobs available
to the claimant in light of the RFC determined by the ALJ. The AU may
give several RFC hypotheticals to the expert to determine which jobs are
available, if any, in light of several RFCs. The claimant, through legal
counsel or qualified representative,44 may also propose questions about
those jobs and their own RFC hypotheticals to the vocational expert. The
vocational expert is aided in his determinations by referring to the Diction-
ary of Occupational Titles, and the ALJ is aided in his deliberations by
referring to a medical vocational guideline, or the Grids, found in Appen-
dix 2 to Subpart P in Regulations Number 4. The Grids consist of tables
organized according to exertional levels of work (i.e., "Sedentary"-lift no
more than ten pounds and stand no more than two hours in an eight-hour
day45 ; "Light"-lift a maximum of twenty pounds and stand six hours a
day; "Medium"-lift up to fifty pounds and stand six hours a day;
"Heavy"-lift no more than a hundred pounds and stand six hours; and
"Very Heavy"-lift over one hundred pounds and stand six hours in a
day). 46
For example, if the vocational expert testifies that the claimant can
perform only sedentary jobs, if the claimant is fifty-five-years-old, unedu-
cated, and has done only unskilled work, 47 and if the claimant has degener-
ative disk disease so severely that he cannot lift more than ten pounds and
stand no more than two hours in an eight-hour day, then the AU is ordina-
rily required to find that the claimant is disabled due to the definitions set
out in the Grid tables. But if the expert testifies that the claimant can do
medium work, the Grids ordinarily require a finding of "not-disabled."
There are exceptions to these rules, but those are not the subject of this
Article.
41. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g) (2012).
42. Id.
43. For a more complete discussion of the role of the vocational expert, the Grids, and other
vocational aspects of the process, see RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 2:30 and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1561, 416.961
(2012).
44. Or a representative with experience in disability hearings and/or who understands basic as-
pects of the program, including the five-step evaluation. A representative's competence is determined
by the ALJ, and this decision is also reviewable.
45. Sedentary is defined as sitting six hours in an eight-hour day and occasionally lifting objects
no more than ten pounds. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 n.25 (5th Cir. 1995).
46. See RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 2:30(e); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967 (2012).
47. For a full discussion of the vocational factors relevant to unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled
work, as well as transferability of skills, see RUSKELL, supra note 7, § 2:30(f) and 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1568(a)-(c),416.968(a)-(c), 404.1568(d)(3), 416.968(d)(3) (2012) (transferability of skills).
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However, the AL's art, skill, and judgment is largely demonstrated by
his or her capacity to accurately determine the claimant's RFC in light of
the medical evidence and other evidence in the (usually electronic) court
file. Indeed, this very abstract determination, although well-guided by reg-
ulations, agency rulings,4 8 and federal court decisions, is difficult enough to
warrant a significant portion of the reversals of ALJs by the Appeals Coun-
cil and federal courts. And this is where the thrust of this Article truly
begins.
C. Defining the "Acceptable Medical Source" for Purposes of
Determining Who is a Treating Physician,
Psychiatrist, or Psychologist
The Social Security Administration pledges, through its regulations,
that before it makes a disability determination, it will develop the claim-
ant's complete medical history4 9 for at least twelve months preceding the
month the claimant files the application (or earlier in some cases), and that
it will either make every reasonable effort to help the claimant obtain med-
ical reports from his own medical sources or that it will take such other
steps as become necessary, including holding consultative examinations, to
thoroughly develop the medical record."o This involves obtaining evidence
from various medical sources. Essentially, medical sources include both
acceptable medical sources and any other health care providers who are
not deemed acceptable medical sources in the regulations." These may
include nurse practitioners, licensed clinical social workers, chiropractors,
therapists, and other similar sources.52
Acceptable medical sources include licensed physicians (M.D. or
D.O.), licensed or certified psychologists, licensed optometrists, licensed
podiatrists, and qualified speech-language pathologists." Only these
sources may establish the existence of a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment, give medical opinions, and be considered a treating
source whose medical opinion may be entitled to controlling weight.54
48. Relevant sources for agency rulings and policies include Social Security Rulings (SSR), a
series of precedential decisions published under the authority of the SSA Commissioner; Acquiescence
Rulings, which explain how the Agency will apply a holding by a U.S. Court of Appeals that varies with
SSA policies; the Program Operations Manual System ("POMS"), for use in internal SSA guidance for
employees; and HALLEX, the Commissioner's procedures for carrying out policies and for guidance in
the processing and adjudication of claims within the Agency. These are not directly involved in the
subject of this Article, although they occasionally come into play within the federal court decisions
analyzed.
49. In addition to medical sources, other non-medical sources are considered by ALJs in deter-
mining disability, including teachers, counselors, social workers, spouses, parents, friends, relatives, em-
ployers, and coworkers. However, acceptable medical sources may carry the greatest weight in these
hearings, a subject to be discussed at length later in this Article.
50. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d), 416.912(d) (2012).
51. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902 (2012).
52. Id.
53. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.914(a) (2012).
54. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 1527(a)(2), 416.913(a), 927(a) (2012).
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An ALJ is required to consider all medical sources in determining
whether a claimant is disabled, but he or she may be required to give "con-
trolling weight" to the treating source opinions on the nature and severity
of the claimant's impairments," though only if those opinions are both
well-supported by medically accepted clinical and laboratory techniques5 6
(e.g., mental status or physical exams, x-rays, or MRIs, respectively) and
are not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record, such as
other credible examining physician or state agency physician findings and
opinions." In other words, the treating source's opinion must be adopted
by the AU in whole or in part where it is supported by the appropriate
findings in the medical evidence record ("MER") and is not substantially
inconsistent with other credible medical opinions.
When an AU declines to give a treating physician's opinion control-
ling weight, his or her other options are (1) to give the treating physician's
opinion some weight, or (2) to reject it entirely in favor of another medical
opinion. However, these options may not be exercised without undergoing
a regulation-mandated analysis. This analysis, when it must be made, and
how extensive it must be, is the crux of this Article.
III. 20 C.F.R. SECTIONS 404.1527(d)2 & 416.927(d)2:
WEIGHING TREATING MEDICAL OPINIONS
Agency regulations are specific about how an AU must analyze medi-
cal source opinions and medical evidence in general. The factors in the
analysis address how to weigh treating, examining, and non-examining phy-
sicians' opinions, as well as those of specialists versus non-specialists."
These factors are found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3-6) and 416.927(d)(3-
6). After promising to evaluate every medical opinion submitted in the
record, the regulations describe how agency adjudicators will weigh such
evidence by considering the following factors:
(1) Examining relationship;59
(2) Treatment relationship;60
55. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996).
56. Supporting documentation is essential because a conclusory statement that a claimant is dis-
abled is not considered to be a medical opinion as contemplated by the regulations, but is instead an
opinion on the ultimate determination that is reserved to the Commissioner (through the AU). Frank
v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 2003).
57. Id.; see also Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2) (2012)).
58. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3)-(6), 416.927(d)(3)-(6) (2012).
59. The agency promises to give more weight to an examining source's opinion than to a non-
examining source's opinion, e.g., a state agency physician who has reviewed the claimant's MER.
60. The agency promises to give more weight to treating source opinions as long as they are well
supported by medically acceptable evidence and are not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in
the case, in which case they will be given controlling weight. If not, all of these factors will be applied to
determine the weight given to that opinion. Good reasons will be given for the weight accorded to the
treating physician's opinion, including a consideration of the nature and extent of treatment, the length
of treatment, and the frequency of examination.
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(3) Support-Ability;6 1
(4) Consistency;62
(5) Specialization; 63 and
(6) Other Factors.'
In Newton v. Apfel, 65 the Fifth Circuit cited the factors in the following
manner:
(1) the physician's length of treatment of the claimant;
(2) the physician's frequency of examination;
(3) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship;
(4) the support of the physician's opinion afforded by the
medical evidence in the record;
(5) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a
whole; and
(6) the specialization of the treating physician.
The regulations themselves actually includes one more factor-"any
factors ... which tend to support or contradict the opinion. "66 As we shall
see subsequently, these "other" factors include, but are not limited to, the
claimant's testimony, statements by non-medical sources such as family
members, statements by employers, evidence of pain or the lack thereof,
medical side effects, and the like.
Thus, we have come to the raison d'etre of this Article: the sufficiency
of an AL's determination of disability often hinges on the weight given to
the treating source's opinion versus the weight given to other treating, ex-
amining, and non-examining physicians' opinions. 67 At the heart of this
analysis lies an issue of whether or not the ALJ has given proper weight to
these opinions.
61. The more supportable the medical source's opinion, the more weight it will be given.
62. Consistency with the record as a whole is the gist of this factor.
63. The agency generally gives more weight to specialists in their fields than to those who are
not.
64. These other factors are discussed later in this Article.
65. 209 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 2000).
66. 20 C.F.R § 404.1527(d)(6) (2012).
67. Non-medical sources are also considered, including (but not limited to) family members, em-
ployers, nurse practitioners, therapists, etc., as explained in detail in SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug.
9, 2006).
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This is because the Commissioner's (i.e., ALJ's and AC's) denial of
Social Security benefits is reviewed to ascertain whether (1) the final deci-
sion is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the Commis-
sioner (ALJ) used the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence.6 8 If
the Commissioner's (ALJ's) findings are indeed supported by substantial
evidence, they must be affirmed. "Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. It is
more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance." The appellate
court may not reweigh the evidence of record, retry the case de novo, or
substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's (i.e., ALJs or affirming
AC's), even if the evidence weighs against the Commissioner's decision or
the appellate court would have ruled differently. 0
The Fifth Circuit's landmark decision discussing these issues was
Newton v. Apfel, wherein the court specifically ruled that:
... absent reliable medical evidence from a treating or ex-
amining physician controverting the claimant's treating spe-
cialist, an ALJ may reject the opinion of the treating
physician only if the ALJ performs a detailed analysis of the
treating physician's views under the criteria set forth in 20
C.F.R. Section 404.1527(d)(2)."
Prior to Newton, the Fifth Circuit had largely engaged in a common
sense analysis 72 of "good cause" to reject a treating medical source's opin-
ion, without specifically requiring the multi-factor analysis mandated by the
regulations. Newton would require this analysis, thus earning its status as a
landmark decision. In light of this ruling and applicable Social Security
Administration regulations and rulings, we must examine the aforesaid
analysis in hope of offering worthwhile guidance to both the ALJs making
these decisions and to the attorneys, representatives, and claimants chal-
lenging those decisions.
68. See Newton, 209 F.3d at 452, Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999); Martinez v.
Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995).
69. Id. (quoting Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995)).
70. Id. (citing Brown, 192 F.3d at 496).
71. Id. at 453. The Newton court cited only the Title II provision of the regulations because the
case at bar was a Title II case. However, the ruling also applies equally to Title XVI cases as per the
mirror provision of Title XVI, 20 C.F.R. § 927(d)(2) (2012).
72. See Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1985) (the AU was reversed for rejecting the
treating doctor's opinion for lack of supporting clinical and laboratory findings where such evidence did
exist, including the doctor's notes of record, without resort to a full blown Newton-mandated analysis).
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IV. INTERPRETATIONS BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND ITS PROGENY
A. Weighing Treating Source Versus Non-Treating,
Non-Examining Source Opinions
There are times when ALJs review treating source opinions that are
uncontroverted by other treating and examining sources, but are contro-
verted by non-treating and non-examining sources. These usually come in
the form of opinions of medical experts ("ME") called by ALJs (and rarely
by claimants) to testify at the hearing, by interrogatory, or by opinions
from state agency physicians or psychologists, any of which have examined
the claimant's entire medical record (or at least the relevant aspects of the
record vis-A-vis the medical expert's specialty) and have offered opinions
about the claimant's disability or lack thereof." The question then arises,
"What weight must the ALJ give to treating medical sources in these
situations?"
B. Versus Testifying Medical Experts
The Newton case specifically considered this issue. The Newton claim-
ant applied for Title II disability insurance benefits due to alleged disabling
effects of her SLE (lupus) impairment.7 4 This caused chest pain and swell-
ing in her feet and knees, which made it difficult and painful for her to
stand, thus preventing her from performing her past work." The ALJ
found that she could nevertheless perform sedentary work and denied her
claim." By doing so, the ALJ rejected the treating physician's opinion that
the claimant could do less than sedentary work (and was thus fully disabled
pursuant to vocational factors established by the vocational expert) and
gave substantial weight to the testifying ME, who asserted that he did not
find evidence in the MER that indicated that the claimant's SLE flare-ups
would prevent her from sitting six to eight hours in a day (light work).7 7
The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision, as did the district court,
and the claimant appealed to the Fifth Circuit."
The Newton court began by stating that the ALJ had the sole responsi-
bility for determining whether the claimant was disabled, that ALJs are
free to reject the opinion of any physician7 9 where the evidence supports a
73. State agency medical sources review the entire record, although there may be additional
MERs submitted by the claimant or obtained by the AU subsequent to that review. The ODAR
offices generally request the state agencies to send the entire medical record to reviewing independent
medical experts; however, due to cost factors, some state agencies will only forward a limited number of
exhibits to the ME. In that case, the best practice for ODAR offices is to send the exhibits most
relevant to the ME's specialty (i.e., the MER related to mental treatment to the psychiatrist ME).
Some reviewing courts in certain locations are apparently unaware of these cost-related limitations in
sending the MER to the ME.
74. Newton, 209 F.3d at 451.
75. Id. at 452.
76. Id. at 454-55.
77. Id. at 453-54.
78. Id. at 455.
79. The court noted that the treating physician was a rheumatologist, a specialist concerning the
claimant's impairment and that the ME was not a specialist; as is the case with all MEs, he had not
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contrary conclusion, and that ALJs are free to assign little or no weight to
the treating physician's opinion for good cause shown.so "Good cause" was
then defined as a showing that the treating physician's evidence was either
(1) conclusory, (2) unsupported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory
or diagnostic techniques, or (3) was otherwise unsupported by the
evidence.a1
However, the court continued, the ALJ must give good reasons in sup-
port of the weight accorded to a treating source's opinion by listing and
analyzing the factors contained in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2-6).' The
court concluded that the ALT "failed to perform this analysis, which should
be conducted on remand."8 3
The court then addressed the issue of the weight accorded to the ME
after observing that the "ALJ expressly relied for her findings on the testi-
mony of the [ME], and her own disbelief of the claimant's testimony.8 4 The
court found that the ME's opinion failed to aver that the claimant's treating
opinion was conclusory or otherwise contradicted by the MER." The
court further noted that the ME's opinion was itself conclusory and unsup-
ported by his own testimony, that the ME did not consider the effects of
the claimant's medication's side effects on the claimant's functioning, and
that the ME did not review all relevant medical records before offering his
opinion.86 For these reasons, the court declared that the ME's testimony
was insufficient to provide the substantial evidence necessary for the AU
to discard the treating physician's opinion and substitute it with that of the
ME.87
"This is not a case," the Newton court stated, "where there is compet-
ing first-hand medical evidence" 8 and the ALJ finds as fact that the other
doctor's opinion is more well-founded than that of the treating physician."
Nor did that case involve an ALJ's weighing of the claimant's treating phy-
sician's opinion against those of other treating or examining physicians.9 0
The court concluded that the ALJ rejected the treating source's opinion
based only on that of a non-specialty, non-treating, non-examining ME,
personally examined the claimant, but only the MER. Id. at 456. The court later declared that the
opinion of a specialist is generally accorded greater weight than a non-specialist. Id. at 455 (citing Paul
v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1994)). However, this factor was not decisive in and of itself as to
the determination of the faulty analysis by the AU regarding the weight given to the treating physician.
Id. at 457.
80. Id. at 455-56; see, e.g., Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994).): Paul, 29 F.3d
at 211.
81. Newton. 209 F.3d at 456 (citing Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237: Paul, 29 F.3d at 211; Brown v.
Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 500 (5th Cir. 1999)).
82. Id. at 455-56.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 457.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Or competing opinions from other treating or examining physicians.
89. Id. at 458 (citing Spellman v. Shalala. 1 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 1993)).
90. Id. (citing Prosch v. Apfel. 201 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2000)).
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and thus the case had to be remanded for proper analysis and
determination.9 1
From this ruling, we may draw several conclusions. First, when there
is a treating physician's opinion in the MER, the ALJ must consider it and
must give it controlling weight if it is properly supported by medically ac-
ceptable clinical, diagnostic, and laboratory findings and if it is not inconsis-
tent with other credible MERs. However, the ALJ may reject a treating
physician's opinion if good cause exists in the form of (1) sufficient compet-
ing medical evidence or (2) a conclusory and unsupported treating source
opinion. In addition, even assuming the possibility of good cause, where
the only controverting evidence comes from a non-examining medical
source, the ALJ is not free to reject a medically supported treating opinion
without undergoing the six-factor analysis contained in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d)(2)-(6) and 416.927(d)(2)-(6). Furthermore, if the non-
treating source's opinion, upon which the ALJ relies, is itself unsupported
and inconsistent with the credible medical evidence, good cause will not be
found to exist. Finally, as will become clearer later, the ALJ should apply
the multi-factor analysis to all medical source opinions because it is the best
basis for determining how much weight to give each opinion.92 This is es-
pecially true if the ALJ is considering rejecting a treating source opinion in
favor of another opinion.
C. Versus Reports from State Agency Reviewing Physicians,
Psychiatrists, and Psychologists
At times, ALJs will reject an alleged treating source's opinion in favor
of a non-treating, non-examining, state agency reviewing physician's or
psychologist's opinion. This may be upheld in two specific situations.9 3
The first is when the medical source alleged to be a claimant's treating
source is not an acceptable medical source. In such a case, the ALJ may
reject that opinion in favor of a non-treating, non-examining physician
without strictly utilizing the six-factor analysis. This occurred in Crisman v.
Astrue, where Magistrate Judge Allan Alexander considered a Title XVI
case in which the claimant alleged disability due to dizziness, a chemical
91. Id. The court also considered another key issue: whether the ALJ should have re-contacted
the claimant's treating physician for clarification or supplementation of his report. Id. at 457-458. In
cases where the report contains conflicts or ambiguities, lacks essential information, or appears not to
be based on medically acceptable clinical, laboratory, and diagnostic techniques, the AU has the re-
sponsibility of contacting the treating physician. See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1998).
However, this regulation has been modified to state that, in such situations, the AU need not always
contact the treating source first if sufficient information may be gained otherwise. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1512, 416.912 (2012).
92. As required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(3)(f)); 416.927(3)(f) (2012).
93. Essentially, these two situations involve an appropriate denial of weight to the treating physi-
cian's opinion because little weight is ordinarily accorded a non-treating, non-examining opinion that
contradicts a treating source opinion. See Lowery v. Astrue, No. 1:09cv427-LG-RHW, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120596140596, at *15 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 21, 2010) (the magistrate judge remanded the case be-
cause the ALJ rejected the treating source's opinion in favor of a contradictory and unsupported non-
examining DDS physician's opinion).
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imbalance, anxiety, hearing loss, and depression.9 4 The ALJ ruled against
the claimant at step five, finding work the claimant could perform despite
her combination of impairments." In so doing, the ALJ rejected the al-
leged treating source opinion on grounds that a therapist was not an ac-
ceptable medical source and thus could not be a treating source who could
offer a diagnosis or an opinion warranting controlling weight, per 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.913(a) and SSR 06-03p.96 The ALJ further gave more weight to two
reviewing state agency psychologists' opinions that the claimant was not
disabled than to the therapist who had found her disabled, finding that the
psychologists' opinions were more consistent with both the claimant's testi-
mony and the treatment notes from the therapist's clinic, Communicare. 97
Because the ALJ considered all the evidence, properly refused to give con-
trolling weight to the therapist's opinion in light of the acceptable medical
source regulation, and gave sound reasons for giving greater weight to the
state agency psychologists' opinions, Judge Alexander affirmed both the
ALJ's decision and the subsequent affirmation by the Appeals Council.98
Judge Alexander added that, where substantial evidence supports a deci-
sion that a claimant is not disabled, the court can only review whether the
ALJ applied the proper legal standards and conducted the proceedings "in
conformity with applicable statues and regulations.99
The Fifth Circuit has continuously allowed an ALJ to give greater
weight to a non-treating, non-examining physician than to the claimant's
alleged treating source.100 The source in Hernandez was viewed based on
Hernandez's testimony as a therapist and not as a medically accepted medi-
cal source and thus was not entitled to controlling weight."01 In Thibo-
deaux, the alleged treating source was a psychiatrist who occasionally
examined the claimant only for medication management; the ALJ held the
psychiatrist to be merely an examining physician.102 Notably, in both cases,
the court only required the ALJ to give a reasonable explanation of why he
chose the opinion of one non-treating physician over the other, and the
court did not require the ALJ to specifically consider the six Newton fac-
tors set out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)-(6) and 416.927(d)(2)-(6), as
94. No. 2:09CV115-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60888, at *2 (N.D. Miss. June 17, 2010); see also
Oddo v. Astrue, No. 1:09CV323-LG-RHW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105978 at *8-10 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 4,
2010) (District Judge Louis Guirola held 1) that an alleged treating doctor was merely an examining
physician who only examined the claimant once and 2) that the AJ properly gave more weight to the
opinion of a state agency physician because the latter opinion was based on the claimant's medical
treatment records while the former was based merely upon the claimant's subjective complaints. The
ALJ made a choice between conflicting opinions, neither being a treating source opinion, and gave a
reasonable explanation as to why he gave more weight to one over the other. Accordingly, his findings
were affirmed).
95. Crisman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60888, at *7.
96. Id. at *15.
97. Id. at *13.
98. Id. at *18.
99. Id. at *8-9 (citing Hernandez v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1983)).
100. See, e.g., id. at 857; Thibodeaux v. Astrue, 324 F. App'x 440 (5th Cir. 2009) (an unpublished
opinion citing Newton in support of its holding).
101. 704 F.2d at 860-61.
102. 324 F. App'x at 442-43.
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there was no treating physician opinion of record, the rejection of which
warranted the aforesaid analysis. 10 3
A second situation when an ALJ may reject the alleged treating
source's opinion in favor of a state agency reviewing physician's opinion is
when the treating source's opinion does not warrant controlling weight and
may be rejected in whole or in part on its own lack of merit. In Reid v.
Astrue, Magistrate Judge Linda Anderson encountered a situation where
the claimant alleged disability under Title II and Title XVI due to sacroiliac
joint dysfunction and arthritis.104 The ALJ had denied the claimant's
claims and the Appeals Council affirmed the denial.o' The claimant ap-
pealed to the U.S. district court, where the appeal was heard by Judge
Anderson. 106
The ALJ had determined that the claimant's two treating physicians'
opinions were not entitled to controlling weight and accorded them less
weight than the state agency reviewing physician's opinion.10 Noting that
if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the court "could not re-
weigh the evidence, try the case de novo, or substitute its judgment for that
of the ALJ even if the court finds evidence that preponderates against the
ALJ's decision," 0 Judge Anderson affirmed the ALJ's decision and the
subsequent Appeals Council affirmation, stating that the ALJ had good
cause to assign reduced weight to the treating physicians' opinions.'09
The ALJ properly gave one treating source opinion less weight (1)
because the bald opinion that the claimant was "100% disabled" was an
opinion on the ultimate issue in controversy, a determination reserved to
the Commissioner (through the ALJ), and (2) because the opinion was
based on the alleged fact that the claimant was accorded special accommo-
dations at the workplace, a fact clearly false in light of the former em-
ployer's testimony. 1 o The second treating physician's opinion was
appropriately given less weight because it was conclusory and based upon
subjective complaints and MRI studies, which, rather than demonstrating
the existence of an impairment, resulted in normal findings."' Judge An-
derson found these explanations to constitute the good cause necessary to
affirm the ALJ's (and AC's) decision.1 12
However, ALJs and practitioners are cautioned that in circumstances
where the opinions of state agencies are pitted against those of treating
103. Id.; Hernandez, 704 F.2d at 860-61.
104. No. 3:10CV237 WHB-LRA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102323, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 15, 2011).
105. Id. at *1-2.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Id. at *20-23.
108. Id. at *11 (citing Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994)).
109. Id. at *23.
110. Id. at *20-21.
111. Id. at *22-23.
112. Id. at *23.
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physicians, the latter should ordinarily be accorded greater weight. In Pat-
terson v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Judge Alex-
ander considered a case where the claimant had alleged disability due to
heart problems and the ALJ had rejected the treating source's opinion in
favor of a non-examining state agency reviewing physician's opinion."' In
a conclusory fashion, the ALJ opined that the treating physician's opinion
did not warrant controlling or even considerable weight because it was not
supported by his treatment and examining notes and was "simply too re-
strictive to be realistic."' 14
Noting that the ALJ failed to apply the Newton six-factor analysis re-
quired by SSA regulations before declining to give the treating physician's
opinion controlling weight, Judge Alexander ruled that the ALJ's explana-
tion did not suffice as good cause for rejecting the treating source's opin-
ion." 5  Furthermore, the court found that the opinion of the non-
examining state agency physician was not entitled to the same weight as
that of the treating physician because it was rendered years earlier than
that of the treating physician and because treating physicians have a
"unique perspective regarding the [claimant's] . . . limitations"" 6 that doc-
tors who "merely review[ ] medical files and perform[ ] no examination"
generally do not."'7 For those reasons, the court concluded, non-examining
physician opinions should generally be accorded less weight. 1 8
V. TREATING SOURCE OPINION IS THE ONLY OPINION IN THE RECORD
As is apparent in the above Part, the opinions of treating physicians
are generally accorded more weight than those of non-treating, non-exam-
ining physicians in SSA regulations and in federal courts. Treating source
opinions are truly the Holy Grail of medical source opinions in the Social
Security disability context. So, the question naturally arises, if non-treat-
ing, non-examining medical source opinions are usually insufficient to re-
but or discard treating source opinions," 9 is the ALJ bound to accept a
treating source's opinion when it is the only opinion found in the medical
record?
The answer is "no," but in accord with matters discussed above, the
ALJ is still required to undergo the analysis mandated in 20 C.F.R.
H§ 404.1527 and 416.927 or risk almost certain reversal. The Fifth Circuit
and Mississippi district courts have encountered this issue on a frequent
basis since Newton was decided and have since offered many suggestions
on what is and is not sufficient good cause for rejecting the treating
source's opinion in whole or in part under this circumstance.
113. No. 2:10CV00042-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134066, at *9-10 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 17, 2010).
114. Id. at *9.
115. Id. at *13-14.
116. Id. at *16.
117. Id. at *15-16 (quoting Filocomo v. Chater, 944 F. Supp. 165, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)).
118. Id.
119. Except in the two rare examples given above.
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Two relatively recent 20 Fifth Circuit cases clearly demonstrate the
type of evidence that will not suffice as good cause to reject a treating
source's opinion.
In Loza v. Apfel, a forty-three-year-old claimant with a GED and
prior military service had been found disabled by the Veteran's Adminis-
tration (VA) and had applied for Social Security disability benefits (Title
II).121 The ALJ denied the claim, rejecting the opinion of the VA doctor
who had determined that the claimant was disabled due to severe impair-
ments of trauma-induced chronic brain syndrome, depression, PTSD, and
after-effects of gunshot wounds.12 2 Another source, known only as "John-
son," related that the neurological exams did not support the claimant's
allegations and that the claimant was likely motivated by secondary gain.123
The VA records were unclear as to whether Johnson was a nurse, psychia-
trist, or medical technician, and the court ruled that this source's "findings"
were unsupported and contradictory to both the findings of all other treat-
ing doctors and the statements given by the claimant's family members,
who were all in agreement that the claimant suffered disabling effects be-
cause of his impairments.12 4
Beginning by conceding that the VA's determination of 100% disabil-
ity was not binding on the ALJ, 2 5 the court nevertheless declared that the
ALJ was not at liberty to reject the VA treating doctor's opinion that the
claimant's impairments were severe and disabling without a full explana-
tion of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).126
Having failed to do so, the court concluded, no good cause existed for re-
jecting the treating doctor's opinion, and the ALJ committed reversible
error.127
While Loza involved severity of impairments issues, Audler v. Astrue
examined listing of impairment issues. There, the ALJ rejected the treating
120. An older, pre-Newton case, Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 1985), held simply
that, where the ALJ rejected the treating doctor's opinion because he found "no clinical or laboratory
findings" to support that opinion, and where the medical record was brimming with such evidence and
no other treating, examining or reviewing physician opinions of record contradicted that opinion, the
ALJ lacked good cause to reject the treating opinion. Because this was a pre-Newton case, the court
merely focused upon the good cause issue and did not address the multi-factor analysis later required in
Newton.
121. 219 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2000).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 383. "Secondary gain" factors were recognized by the court as those noted in
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 698 (24th ed. 1982): "interpersonal or social advantages, such as atten-
tion, assistance or sympathy that a person gains directly from having an organic illness." Id. at n.8.
Today, many psychologists performing SSA consultative examinations refer to "secondary gain" as
fraudulent attempts to acquire Social Security benefits by malingering, exaggerating, or giving less than
full efforts during consultative examinations.
124. Id. at 383-84.
125. Id. at 394-95. See also SSR 96-10p, 1996 WL 743753 (Dec. 30, 1996); Latham v. Shalala, 36
F.3d 482. 483 (5th Cir. 1994) (although not binding, VA opinions should be considered and not entirely
disregarded by the ALJ, who should apply the multi-factored analysis mandated for consideration of all
medical evidence in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1927(d) and 416.927(d) to these opinions).
126. Id. at 395 (citing Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2000); Scott v. Heckler, 770
F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1985); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232. 237 (5th Cir. 1994)).
127. Loza, 219 F.3d at 395.
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physicians' opinions that the claimant met Listing 1.04-the musculoskele-
tal listing. 12 8 Where the treating orthopedic surgeon buttressed his "dis-
abled" opinion with a clinical examination replete with symptoms of nerve
root compression, including positive straight leg raising, limited spinal
range of motion, and motor and sensory loss, the court explained that the
ALJ was not free to reject that opinion without a sufficient explanation to
the contrary, arrived at through the Newton factor analysis. 2 9
Audler and Loza involved the AL's failure to offer any mandated
analysis to support a rejection of the treating physicians' opinions. How-
ever, in two other cases where the ALJ did offer such an analysis, a court
found those analyses sufficient to demonstrate good cause for the rejection
of treating source opinions.
In Moore v. Astrue, Magistrate Judge Alexander affirmed an ALJ's
rejection of a treating doctor's opinion where there were no other medical
opinions of record because (1) the treating doctor only provided routine
medical care on two occasions since the claimant's alleged onset; (2) the
doctor's opinion was related to the claimant's depression, a matter outside
his specialty; (3) the doctor provided no notes in support of his conclusory
opinion; and (4) the doctor had previously penned a letter stating that the
claimant's examinations "did not reveal any severe physical
deficiencies. "130
Judge Alexander declared that "[t]he ALJ is required by federal regu-
lation to consider six factors when determining" whether to give the treat-
ing physician's opinion controlling weight.131 The ALJ did consider these
factors, the court noted, and despite the treating doctor's longitudinal care,
good cause existed to reject the opinion, not the least of which was that the
doctor failed to submit any notes supporting his conclusions.13 2
128. 501 F.3d 446, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2007). Musculoskeletal impairments are some of the most
frequently alleged impairments, as human spines have not evolved sufficiently to keep up with our
sitting and standing activities since we first began to walk upright. This particular listing considers tests
such as x-rays, MRIs, and physical examinations that demonstrate herniated disks, arthritis and other
similar impairments that cause nerve root impingement, extremity sensory, motor, and reflex loss, and
concordant disabling pain, loss of range of motion, and inhibited functions such as standing, walking,
and sitting. For those who find the various musculoskeletal impairments difficult to distinguish, see
Panel on Musculoskeletal Disorders & the Workplace, Nat'l Research Council & Inst. of Med., Muscu-
loskeletal Disorders and the Workplace: Low Back Pain and Upper Extremities 19 (2001), which defines
the impairments as: "Radiculopathy is a disease of the roots of the spinal nerves. Spondylosis is the
slippage of a vertebra that lies behind the spinal cord. Spondylolisthesis is the slippage of a vertebra on
the vertebra below. Spinal stenosis is a narrowing of the spinal canal, usually due to osteoarthritis and
sometimes with pressure on the nerve root." See also Anthony M. Gawienowski & David, Oh, My
Aching Back: Establishing Presumptively Disabling Low Back Impairments in Social Security Determi-
nations, 59 J. Mo. B. 133 (2003) for a thorough explanation of the factors involved in offering proof
sufficient to meet listing 1.04.
129. Audler, 501 F.3d at 448-49.
130. No. 1:09-CV-306-SA-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72272, at *6--7 (S.D. Miss. July 1, 2010).
The claimant was forty-six years old, had a college degree, and had past relevant work as a band direc-
tor. Among his allegations were depression, obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and sleep apnea. Id. at *2.
131. Id. at *8-9.
132. Id. at *9.
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In Coleman v. Astrue,'13 3 where a fifty-one-year-old high school gradu-
ate and former manager of a moving and storage company alleged disabil-
ity for degenerative disk disease, humerus fracture, chronic painl3 4 and
depression, the ALJ denied the claim and rejected the treating physician's
opinion that the claimant was disabled due to pain. Noting that "the ALJ
did not specifically enumerate all the six factors followed by an explana-
tion," Judge Alexander nevertheless found that there was "substantial evi-
dence to support the ALJ's conclusion not to give controlling weight to
[the claimant's] treating physician's opinions. "135 The court observed that
the ALJ thoroughly discussed the doctor's lack of substantial longitudinal
care of the claimant, the doctor's very limited examinations of the claimant,
and the lack of objective findings in the doctor's notes on which the disa-
bling opinion was based.136 Judge Alexander also stated that the examina-
tions discussed by the ALJ revealed that, despite allegations of severe pain,
the claimant had a normal gait and no numbness, tingling, atrophy, swell-
ing, weakness, or muscle loss.137 In other words, despite a lack of specific
and literal application of the six Newton factors, the court deemed the
ALJ's analysis of those factors sufficient to demonstrate good cause in light
of his thorough discussion of all the relevant factors included in the Newton
analysis.
In conclusion, the post-Newton world of the Fifth Circuit shows that in
order to reject a treating source's opinion where there are no other medical
opinions of record, the ALJ must (1) offer a thorough and supportable
analysis of the treating physician's opinion before rejecting it in whole or in
part, and (2) in so doing, must utilize the six regulation-mandated and
Newton-mandated factors (whether specifically listing them or not) in the
analysis. Additionally, the extent to which the ALJ may offer a less than
sparkling Newton analysis will likely depend upon how unsupported and
conclusory the treating doctor's opinion may be. In other words, if the
treating doctor's opinion is supported in the medical record and is not con-
clusory, a detailed analysis will likely be in order; if not, the ALJ's analysis
may be more brief if it succinctly hits enough points to demonstrate good
cause for rejecting the opinion.
However, it should be noted that as far as my research reveals, the
Fifth Circuit has never directly addressed the issue of whether ALJs must
strictly cite all six factors and individually address them where no other
opinion exists or if they may substantially do so in order to properly reject
the treating physician's opinion. Until that decision, Mississippi ALJs
should substantially, if not strictly, resort to the six-factor Newton analysis
133. No. 1:08-CV-230-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22899, at*10 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2010).
134. Pain is a significant issue in disability hearings. For a discussion of evaluations of subjective
complaints of pain in those hearings, see 20.C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929 (2012); Hollis v. Bowen, 857
F.2d 1378, 1384 (5th Cir. 1998); and Adams v. Bowen, 833 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1987).
135. Coleman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22899, at *13.
136. Id. at *13-14.
137. Id. at *10.
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to the extent that circumstances, reason, common sense, and limited
time 3 8 allow.
VI. TREATING VERSUS OTHER TREATING AND EXAMINING
PHYSICIANS' OPINIONS
While opinions of reviewing, non-treating, and non-examining physi-
cians are generally not accorded as much weight as those of treating physi-
cians, this is not always the case with those of other examining physicians
(treating or consultative examining physicians) whose opinions differ from
that of the primary treating physician. However, as the following cases
demonstrate, ALJs must still defer to treating source opinions unless they
can demonstrate good cause for not doing so, though a precise Newton
factor analysis will not be required if there are no contradictory opinions of
record offered by examining physicians.
A. Consultative Examining Physicians, Psychiatrists, and Psychologists
After a disability petition has been filed but before the disability hear-
ing on the petition, state agencies may order consultative examinations of
the claimant by physicians and psychologists who are specialists in the
fields relevant to the claimant's alleged impairments (e.g., internal
medicine for diabetics, orthopedic exams for back pain sufferers, pediatric
exams for children, psychiatric exams for the depressed, etc.). After the
state agency denies the claim and the case transfers to the ODAR office for
a hearing, the ALJ assigned to the case may order additional initial consult-
ative exams1 39 where the medical record is insufficient for an appropriate
decision.140 Quite often, the consultative examining ("CE") doctor's ap-
praisal of the claimant's RFC differs substantially from that of the treating
physician's, just as RFC opinions differ from other treating doctors in the
medical record. We will first examine the analysis of weight given to the
treating doctor when pitted against a competing opinion from a consulta-
tive examining physician.
Unlike pre-Newton cases relevant to non-treating, non-examining phy-
sicians, cases concerning consultative examining physician opinions versus
treating doctor opinions are relevant to post-Newton inquiries. This is be-
cause those older cases applied common sense rules, replete with phrases
such as "substantial evidence," "good cause," and "reasonable minds" to
the analysis of weight to be given to treating physicians in this context.
138. ALJs are expected to prepare for, hold, and write opinions for (with the help of attorney
writers) between 500 and 700 cases a year, in which they must consider a myriad of issues in every case,
including, but by no means limited to, medical opinions, claimant credibility, pain, vocational factors,
and further development of the record, to say nothing of the hundreds or thousands of pages of medical
records to be reviewed in each case. As time consuming as these activities are, it stands to reason that
appellate courts have good reason not to burden ALis with strict requirements of every kind of analysis
so long as reasonable analysis is offered sufficient to meet the ends of justice.
139. Or, the AU may order initial exams if there are none of record and if they are required for
proper adjudication of the claim.
140. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404, 416 (2012).
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And as will become clear below, where treating physician opinions are
weighed against other examining physician or psychologist opinions, a full
Newton six-factor analysis is not ordinarily required.
The first of these pre-Newton cases is Bradley v. Bowen, where the
claimant, a former machine operator and assistant office manager, alleged
Title II disability for a back injury sustained on the job that led to back
surgery, post-surgery pain, and substantial functional limitations.141 The
treating physician offered an opinion that the claimant was temporarily dis-
abled and unable to walk, sit, stand, or lift more than five pounds. 142 A
consultative examining orthopedic surgeon examined the claimant and
opined that he could perform sedentary work-sit for two hours in a day,
occasionally bend, lift five pounds, and push and pull twenty pounds. 143 A
neurologist who examined the claimant at the treating physician's request
found that despite some pain, the claimant suffered no muscle spasms and
retained 100% of his strength.144
The ALJ accepted the opinion of the consultative examining orthope-
dic surgeon over that of the treating physician, and the court affirmed that
finding. 145 The court cited prevailing law that, although the treating physi-
cian's opinion was generally entitled to more weight than that of an exam-
ining physician, an ALJ was free to reject the opinion of any physician
when substantial evidence supported that choice.146
The Fifth Circuit offered more medical source opinion analysis in the
subsequent case of Martinez v. Chater.147 The Martinez court considered a
treating doctor's opinion that the claimant suffered from arthritis and dia-
betes-an opinion buttressed by an X-ray report and alluded to by the
treating doctor but not submitted in the record by the claimant. A CE
physician's report indicated that the claimant suffered arthritis but had no
functional limitations apart from occasional postural limits, and that the
claimant had a history of non-insulin diabetes but suffered no end organ
damage as a result. A ME reviewed the record and agreed with the con-
sultative examining doctor.148
After the ALJ rejected the treating doctor's opinion in favor of the
consultative examining doctor's, the claimant appealed and the court en-
gaged in a four-prong consideration of (1) the objective medical facts, (2)
the opinions of treating and examining physicians, (3) the claimants subjec-
tive evidence of pain and disability, and (4) the claimant's age, education,
and work history.1 49 The court's opinion, hung primarily upon fathoming
141. 809 F.2d 1054, 1055 (5th Cir. 1987).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1055-56.
145. Id. at 1057.
146. Id. The court did not comment on what evidence sufficed as substantial.
147. 64 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 1995).
148. Id. at 175.
149. The claimant was fifty-two, semi-illiterate, and a former machine sander and fruit picker
(medium work). Id. at 174.
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the contrary opinions, affirmed the ALJ, noting that the treating physi-
cian's opinion was both unsupported by any objective evidence such as X-
rays or laboratory data and was also inconsistent with the findings of the
CE and ME, which were based upon objective clinical test results. 15 0 The
four matters considered by the Martinez court were later subsumed but
expanded upon by the six Newton factors drawn from 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d).
Finally, in Greenspan v. Shalala, the court offered even more analysis
where the ALJ rejected two treating physicians' opinions in favor of the
opinions of several consultative examining physicians.15 1 The claimant, a
fifty-two-year-old, high-school graduate and former clothing sales manager,
offered reports from his treating physicians that he suffered from an eco-
logical immune deficiency illnesses that affected every part of his body, an
atypical somatoform disorder, 52 and a histrionic personality disorder.1 5 3
Several CE physicians and psychologists countered those assertions with
reports that questioned the validity of "ecological medicine" and declared
that the claimant suffered no mental impairments.154
The court began its analysis by agreeing with the claimant that estab-
lished precedent held that "ordinarily the opinions, diagnoses, and medical
evidence of a treating physician who is familiar with the claimant's injuries,
treatments, and responses should be accorded considerable weight in de-
termining disability."'15  However, the court continued, those opinions
were far from conclusive, as the ALJ had the sole responsibility for deter-
mining disability status and ascertaining the credibility of both medical ex-
perts and lay witnesses, weighing their opinions accordingly.' 5 6 The court
noted that the ALJ "carefully considered, but ultimately rejected, the treat-
ing physicians' opinions that the claimant was disabled," in accordance with
the SSA's regulatory promise in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 to weigh all medical
evidence when the treating medical opinion was internally or externally
inconsistent.1 5 ' The court concluded that substantial evidence supported
the ALJ's decision because the treating physicians' opinions were based
upon dubious medical techniques, were conclusory, and were contradicted
by their own notes and outside medical evidence (the CE reports).'5 8
The foregoing pre-Newton cases provided some common sense gui-
dance to ALJs for analysis of how much weight to give treating source
opinions vis-d-vis other contradictory examining medical source opinions.
Subsequently, the Newton case brought the Fifth Circuit more in line with
150. Id. at 175.
151. 38 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1994).
152. Somatoform disorder may be distinguished from malingering in that the latter involves
knowingly false statements for secondary gain, while the former involves a mental condition that con-
vinces the patient he suffers from impairments for which there is no objective evidentiary support.
153. Id. at 234.
154. Id. at 235.
155. Id. at 237 (citing Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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the relevant Social Security regulations, which the Fifth Circuit was bound
to interpret faithfully. The following cases are recent post-Newton cases
that applied the regulatory analysis specifically mandated by 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d) to the issue of weighing treating source
opinions versus examining source opinions.
In Thibodeaux v. Astrue, an unpublished decision cited for the court's
reasoning and not for its holding, the court upheld an ALJ's rejection of a
treating psychiatrist's and treating therapist's opinions in favor of a CE
neurologist's opinion because (1) the psychiatrist's treatment was not at a
level commensurate with the alleged severity of disability, (2) the psychia-
trist recommended that the claimant seek employment, (3) the psychia-
trist's conclusory opinion that the claimant was disabled was a
determination reserved to the Commissioner (ALJ), (4) the treating thera-
pist was not an acceptable medical source, and thus the ALJ was not re-
quired to give that opinion deference, and (5) the CE neurologist
contradicted both of those opinions with a report supported by objective
evidence.159
Noting that the ALJ might have given the treating psychiatrist's opin-
ion some weight rather than rejecting it entirely, the court declared that
because there were two opposing reports from treating or examining doc-
tors, the ALJ was free to choose between them so long as substantial evi-
dence supported his decision.' 6 0 More significantly, the court ruled that
prior to rejecting the treating psychiatrist's opinion, the ALJ was "not re-
quired to apply the criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)."' 6 ' This
was so, the court concluded, because (1) the examining neurologist's opin-
ion constituted reliable medical evidence contradicting the treating psychi-
atrist's opinion, and (2) substantial evidence, such as the treating doctor's
determination that the claimant should seek employment, supported the
ALJ's finding and gave the ALJ good cause to reject the treating doctor's
162opinion.
In Bean v. Astrue, Magistrate Judge Alexander ruled that an ALJ was
correct in not giving controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion
and that the ALJ properly gave that opinion less weight than the CE physi-
cian's opinion.163 The ALJ agreed with the treating physician's assessment
of how long the claimantl6 4 could sit (six hours in a day) but rejected the
rest of the treating physician's opinion, instead choosing to adopt the CE's
opinion as to how long the claimant could stand (five hours in a day), lift
159. 324 F. App'x 440 444-45 (5th Cir. 2009).
160. Id. at 443-44.
161. Id. at 445 (citing Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 453, 456 (5th Cir. 2000)).
162. Id.
163. No. 3:08CV75-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12715, at *24-25 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 2, 2010).
164. The claimant was a forty-six year-old former seamstress alleging hypertension, anemia, ar-
thritis, and obesity. Id. at *2. For a detailed explanation of how an ALJ should properly apply SSR 02-
Olp (2002), the ruling pertaining to obesity, whenever obesity is found to be a severe impairment, see
Judge Alexander's excellent discussion in Bean, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12715, at *12-13.
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(ten pounds occasionally), and climb, balance, stoop, and crawl (occasion-
ally 165 ).16 6 Judge Alexander held that the ALJ did not commit reversible
error by failing to "expressly delineate each individual factor" of 20 C.F.R.
H§ 404.1527 and 416.927,167 finding that Newton requires remand when an
ALJ rejects a treating physician's opinion either (1) in favor of a non-treat-
ing, non-examining physician's opinion, or (2) where there is no other opin-
ion of record in the case.'6 8 However, when the ALJ fails to give the
treating physician's opinion controlling weight and chooses another exam-
ining doctor's opinion over that of the treating physician's, he or she must
only discuss such relevant factors as are necessary to provide substantial
evidence for the decision-substantial enough to constitute good cause for
affording the treating physician's opinion lesser weight.16 9
In support of her decision, Judge Alexander cited Newton and two
pre-Newton cases: Bradley v. Bowen and Martinez v. Chater.170 This dem-
onstrates how certain pre-Newton cases offer considerable insight into the
inherent, commonsensical approach required when an ALJ refuses to give
controlling weight to a treating physician and gives that opinion less weight
than that of an examining physician.
Nevertheless, our courts apparently take two approaches to this less-
detailed treating versus examining opinion analysis. The first I will call the
"non-delineation approach"; the second, the "less detail" rule.
Judge Alexander has repeatedly ruled that though an express delinea-
tion of the six Newton factors is not required, enough factors must be ad-
dressed to provide good cause for giving the treating physician's opinion
less weight than that of another examining physician's opinion. For exam-
ple, in Lewis v. Astrue, Judge Alexander upheld an ALJ's rejection of two
treating doctors' opinions that the claimant was disabled due to diabetes,
obesity, and heart disease in favor of a CE physician's opinion that the
claimant could still perform light work.171 She did so because the treating
doctor's opinion was inconsistent with his own notes, the doctor's notes
contained no functional restrictions for the claimant, the doctor advised the
claimant to diet and exercise, and the claimant testified that he could per-
form many activities of daily living.17 2 Noting that the ALJ had not specifi-
cally delineated the six Newton factors in his analysis, Judge Alexander
nevertheless found that the ALJ had "clearly reviewed and relied upon
[the two doctors'] records in rejecting their opinions." It was these factors,
the court declared, as well as the claimant's testimony, which constituted
165. In our program, we utilize certain words of art. For example, "occasionally" means up to 1/3
of an eight-hour day, while "frequently" means up to 2/3 of an eight-hour day.
166. Id. at *20.
167. Id. at *24.
168. Id. at *22.
169. Id. at *25.
170. Id. at 07.
171. No. 2:09CV26-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54178, at *15 (N.D. Miss. June 1, 2010).
172. Id. at *1, 14-15.
354 [VOL. 31:329
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CASES
substantial evidence and good cause to reject the treating physician's
opinions."'
Similarly, in Southard v. Astrue, Judge Alexander noted that an ALJ
failed to make a specific delineation of the six Newton factors; nevertheless,
Judge Alexander affirmed the ALJ's granting of less weight to two treating
physicians' opinions that the claimant was mentally disabled in favor of the
opinions of two CEs, one a psychologist and one an internal medicine phy-
sician, who both opined that the claimant suffered no disabling impair-
ments.1 74 Judge Alexander found that good cause for affirmation existed
because the ALJ thoroughly reviewed and discussed the treating doctors'
records and the record as a whole, determining that the first treating doc-
tor's opinion was inconsistent with his own notes, stated the ultimate opin-
ion reserved to the ALJ's determination in a conclusory fashion, and was
an opinion about the claimant's mental health when the doctor was not a
mental health specialist.1"5 Judge Alexander found that the second treating
physician's opinion was properly rejected because that doctor saw the
claimant only once, gave no functional restrictions but instead said the
claimant was "likely disabled," and provided treatment notes that were in-
consistent with the record as a whole. 1 7 6
As for my "less detail" rule, in Myers v. Astrue, Magistrate Judge John
Roper, Jr., clearly stated that the six Newton factor analysis gleaned from
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) was not required when an ALJ gave less weight
to a treating physician's opinion than to that of a CE.177 This was so, Judge
Roper reasoned, because the three treating physicians' findings and opin-
ions were inconsistent with the medical record as a whole, and reliable
medical evidence from other examining sources controverted their opin-
ions."1 7  Rejecting the claimant's argument that the ALJ should have uti-
lized the Newton six-factor test in his analysis before rejecting the treating
physicians' opinions, the court distinguished the case from Newton on the
grounds that Newton (and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) and 416.927(d)(2))
stood for the proposition that such an analysis was required only when re-
jecting a treating opinion in favor of a non-treating, non-examining physi-
cian's opinion and not when 'competing first hand medical evidence'
existed that contradicted the treating physicians' assessments.17 9 However,
Judge Roper noted that the ALJ made a thorough examination of the en-
tire record and offered substantial reasons supported by the medical record
(including the treating doctors' inconsistent findings and the CE's sup-
ported findings) that sufficed as good cause for the rejection.
173. Id. at *19.
174. No. 1:09CV142-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56507, at *14 (N.D. Miss. June 7, 2010).
175. Id. at *8-9.
176. Id.
177. No. 5:09cv121-DCB-JMR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142434, at *35 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 18, 2010).
178. Id.
179. Id. at *34.
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These two seemingly divergent interpretations of Newton by our mag-
istrate judges are easily reconcilable. Judge Alexander holds that a deline-
ated analysis of all six Newton factors is not necessary to reject a treating
source's opinion in favor of a contradictory and supportable CE opinion so
long as relevant factors are discussed to provide good cause for doing so.
Judge Roper rules that though a Newton analysis is not required at all in
this circumstance, the ALJ must still engage in a thorough (albeit less de-
tailed) analysis of the entire medical record to base his rejection upon sub-
stantial evidence constituting good cause to do so. In the latter case, the
ALJ must still resort to the six factors contained in the regulations-and as
mandated by Newton-because they are the only conceivable factors that
can support a rejection of a treating physician's opinion. The practical dif-
ference between this shortened analysis and the full-bore Newton analysis
is that the Newton analysis need not be as detailed and does not require a
strict citation to all six factors as does the scenario where the ALJ rejects
the treating opinion in favor of that of a non-treating, non-reviewing
physician.
However, from the ALJ's perspective, it is hardly safe to assume that
he or she may freely reject a treating source's opinion in favor of a CE's
opinion with only a modicum of analysis. In two recent Northern District
of Mississippi cases, Judge Alexander reversed ALJs for giving more
weight to CE opinions than to the opinions of treating sources. In Logan v.
Astrue, a claimant argued that the ALJ did not give due consideration to
the treating psychiatrist's and internal medicine doctor's opinions that she
was disabled due to depression and anxiety, which allegedly limited her
capacity to concentrate and interact sufficiently with others in a work envi-
ronment."s The ALJ "discounted" these doctors' opinions in favor of an
examining psychologist's opinion that the claimant was not mentally dis-
abled, despite similar limitations in opinions by the treating doctors.181
Judge Alexander declared that before rejecting the treating physicians'
opinions, the ALJ was required to explain his rationale for doing so in ac-
cordance with the six factors. Consideration of those factors, she added,
"would likely have led to a different result."' 82 Both treating doctors had
longitudinal care of the claimant (one was a psychiatric specialist), and
both offered substantial evidence of disability in their treatment notes, in-
cluding discussions that the claimant had repeated periods of regression,
anxiety, lack of energy, hallucinations, and periods of inability to care for
her children.18 ' Because this constituted supporting medical evidence, the
court concluded, and because the CE stated in his report that he had no
180. No. 3:09-CV-101-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61497, at *6 (N.D. Miss. June 21, 2010).
181. Id. All medical sources determined that the claimant could not understand and carry out
detailed instructions and would function best in a non-interpersonally intensive work environment. Id.
182. Id. at *8.
183. Id. at *8-9.
356 [VOL. 31:329
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CASES
access to the medical history of the claimant or to documentation support-
ing the allegations of depression, the report failed to contradict the treating
doctors' opinions, requiring remand of the decision.
Although seemingly at odds with the above decisions in this Part, this
opinion is not inconsistent. Judge Alexander reversed the ALJ because (1)
the two treating doctors' opinions were consistent, unlike those in the af-
firmed cases; (2) they offered medically supported rather than conclusory
opinions, unlike many of the above-related affirmed opinions in this Sec-
tion; and (3) although there was a contradictory CE report, the CE was
entirely unfamiliar with the claimant's medical record and offered nothing
to contradict the treating physicians' opinions.'" In other words, the treat-
ing physicians' opinions were reasonably supported and were not contra-
dicted by any medical evidence of record, including that of an examining
physician. Consequently, the ALJ was required (per 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527
and 416.927 and Newton) to utilize the mandated six-factor analysis.
Again, in Woodard v. Astrue, a forty-five-year-old claimant with a high
school degree and past jobs as a babysitter, sewing machine operator, and
stocking clerk appealed an ALJ's ruling that gave less weight to the treat-
ing doctor's opinions that she was disabled due to degenerative disk disease
than to the opinion of a CE that she was not disabled.1 5 The ALJ gave
limited weight to the treating opinionS186 because they were " 'inconsistent
with the substantial evidence in the record and his own objective medical
findings.1"'1 7 However, Judge Alexander found that the ALJ did not state
how the opinions were inconsistent with the medical record or with the
doctor's own findings, finding that the treating physician's opinion was in
fact supported by objective tests such as X-rays, blood work, and CT
scans.18 8 And as for the CE's opinion, Judge Alexander noted that the CE
"did not have any 'outside medical records, imaging procedures, test results
or other information ... for additional consideration, correlation or corrob-
oration' to consider in formulating his opinion."189 Further, the CE did not
provide a medical opinion as to limitations that would contradict the opin-
ions of the treating doctors, and his report neither substantiated nor dis-
proved the claimant's complaints.19 0 In such situations, the court
184. In fairness to the AL., state agencies often refuse to send all exhibits in the record to CEs
because of expense, and ALJs feel they must go with what they have. However, this approach was held
insufficient here, and this cautionary decision may mean that the AU cannot give as much weight to
the CE in such circumstances, or must re-contact the CE and ask him to consider additional evidence
and offer another opinion in order to sufficiently buttress his own opinion with substantial evidence.
Id.
185. No. 3:10cv0101-SAA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58049, at *7-8 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2011).
186. These opinions found that the claimant was limited to sedentary work, had severe limitation
of range of motion of her neck, and would miss up to four days a month because of pain. Id. at *9.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *10 (citing Appeal R. at 216).
190. Id.
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concluded, the ALJ was required to provide a Newton and regulation man-
dated six-factor analysis before giving less weight to the treating doctor's
opinions and accepting the findings of the CE.191
In other words, the ALJ did not explain his reasons for giving less
weight to the treating doctor's opinions, which were in fact supported by
objective tests, and giving more weight to a CE's findings, which were not
supported by longitudinal care or laboratory tests, where that CE had no
outside medical records to consider and offered no contradictory opinions
to those of the treating doctor's. Where a CE opinion does not actually
contradict a treating opinion that is well-supported by objective medical
evidence, Newton and the regulations clearly require that the six-factor
analysis be performed before giving less or no weight to the treating
source's opinions.
The reality is that having a CE opinion of record (or examination re-
port sans opinion) that does not actually contradict the treating opinion is
tantamount to having no examining physician opinion contradicting the
treating physician's opinion at all. In either case, the regulations' six-factor
analysis is required before giving less or no weight to the treating physi-
cian's opinion. And if the regulations were not clear enough on this point,
the Newton decision makes it crystal clear within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, decisions by Mississippi's U.S. district court and magis-
trate judges have driven this point home with such clarity that it almost
boggles the mind that practicing attorneys and ALJs in Mississippi some-
times act as if they have not heard of the analysis at all.192
B. Other Treating Physicians, Psychiatrists, and Psychologists
The same rules applicable to consultative examining physicians apply
to other treating physicians. In light of the six-factor analysis, it should be
noted that CEs are usually specialists in relevant fields and understand the
SSA's evidentiary requirements for disability determinations, while other
treating doctors usually offer longitudinal care to the claimants but fre-
quently know little of the SSA's evidentiary requirements. 193 It should also
be noted that if other so-called treating physicians have only seen the
claimant once or twice in a lengthy period, then they are merely "other"
examining doctors, who are lower on the weight-giving scale than treating
doctors.
191. Id. at *10-11.
192. I am pointing the finger at no one more than myself, as I failed to fully comprehend the finer
points of this analysis well into my tenure as an AU, despite the excellent training afforded me by my
agency. How I won fourteen social security disability cases in a row representing claimants in the 1990s
remains as impenetrable a mystery as those conundrums Woody Allen failed to solve in Hannah and
Her Sisters, such as why were there Nazis if God exists and how does the can-opener work?
193. At such times, it falls to the attorney to explain the regulations to the doctor. Failing to do so
often results in an unsupported conclusory "disabled" opinion or one that is out of line with the MER
as well as common sense. Both such opinions are easily dispatched by ALis armed with the knowledge
of the provisions in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927.
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In Holifield v. Astrue, an ALJ declined to give controlling weight to a
treating doctor's opinion that the claimant was disabled due to back and
leg impairments and gave greater weight to another treating physician's
findings that indicated that the claimant was not disabled.1 94 The court ob-
served that the ALJ determined that the treating physician's opinion was
"not only conclusory and unsubstantiated, but was actually contradicted by
objective medical evidence in the record." 19 5 That objective evidence came
in the form of another treating doctor's findings that the claimant had neg-
ative straight-leg raising and intact reflexes, contrary to the first treating
doctor's findings, and that two MRIs "failed to disclose the presence of
nerve root compression."1 96 Noting that a treating physician's opinion
should generally be given considerable or controlling weight in determining
disability, the court nevertheless declared that when a treating opinion is
not well supported by credible and objective medical evidence and is incon-
sistent with other substantial evidence, the ALJ is "free to assign little or
no weight to the opinion of any physician for good cause."197 Accordingly,
because the treating doctor's opinion was unsupported and because the
contradictory findings of the other treating physician were supported, the
court ruled that the ALJ had no obligation to engage in the six-factor anal-
ysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 1527(d)(2) and the Newton case.19 s
Similarly, in Magee v. Astrue, District Court Judge Halil Ozerden af-
firmed the findings of an ALJ, the Appeals Council, and a magistrate judge
that found that the ALJ's failure to address the factors in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(d) was not reversible. 199 Judge Ozerden declared that the Magis-
trate Judge properly found that the ALJ "was not required to detail more
exhaustively her reasons for not affording controlling weight to the [treat-
ing doctor's opinion]," because first-hand evidence from another treating
doctor and other sources contradicted the primary treating doctor's assess-
ments.20 0 This evidence involved findings adduced from the other treating
doctor's examination, MRI results, the claimant's own testimony regarding
194. 402 F. App'x 24, 27-28 (5th Cir. 2010).
195. Id. at 26.
196. Id. at 25.
197. Id. at 26 (citing Newton, 209 F.3d at 455-56).
198. Id. at 27. The court also rejected the claimant's contention that the ALJ should have further
developed the record as sometimes required in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) because the claimant had
ample opportunity to supplement the record and did not, and also because the claimant could not show
the prejudice necessary for reversal. Id. at 226-27. Additionally, the court rejected the claimant's argu-
ment that the AU should be reversed for not re-contacting the treating physician as is sometimes
required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1). Id. at 27. The court found that the treating physician's record
was inconclusive or otherwise inadequate to receive controlling weight because the record contained
contradictory evidence from another treating physician. Id.
Regarding the re-contact rule, ALis and practitioners are cautioned that the regulations concern-
ing re-contacting the treating physician were amended in March 2012 to provide that the treating physi-
cian need not be re-contacted in situations where other evidence in the MER can clear up the
inconclusive aspects or where other doctors may be contacted to clear up any such concerns, and where
contacting other doctors may be easier or more fruitful. If not, the treating physician must still be re-
contacted to resolve the inconclusive or inadequate opinions.
199. No. 1:09cv620HSO-JMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33949, at *20-22 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2011).
200. Id. at *18-19.
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her activities of daily living, her mother's statement of her activities of daily
living, and a report from one of the claimant's teachers that indicated good
functioning.20 ' The court stated that when a treating physician's opinion is
unsupported by medically acceptable clinical, diagnostic, and laboratory
techniques (or is otherwise unsupported by the evidence) and the record
contains reliable medical evidence controverting a treating source's opin-
ion, "the ALJ is under no obligation to perform a detailed analysis pursu-
ant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) before rejecting those opinions. "202
Significantly, the court added that "the ALJ did consider [the regulation's
six factors], though not explicitly or sequentially, with regard to both
physicians."2 03
That case supports the proposition that an ALJ is not required to un-
dergo a detailed six-factor analysis before rejecting a treating source's opin-
ion where the treating source's opinion is conclusory and unsupported by
objective medical evidence and where there exists of record a credible con-
tradictory opinion or objective set of findings. Even so, a consideration of
the six factors is the best proof that the ALJ thoroughly considered the
record and found substantial evidence constituting good cause to reject the
treating opinion.204
On the other hand, as Judge Alexander decided in Chandler v. Astrue,
where an ALJ summarily rejected a treating neurologist's positive objec-
tive findings on EMG/NCS tests that demonstrated carpal tunnel syndrome
(CTS) in favor of the findings of another treating physician's exam that
indicated a lack of CTS, the rejection warrants remand.20 5 The court noted
that the ALJ failed to explain why he disregarded "a neurological study
that is medically accepted as the method for diagnosing [CTS] and chose to
'give weight' to [the other treating doctor's opinion]," "thus resulting in his
evaluation of the [claimant's] RFC being unsupported by substantial evi-
dence."2 06 The result, Judge Alexander declared, was that the ALJ's ulti-
mate decision as to disability was also unsupported by substantial evidence,
and remand was required.207 Once more, this decision makes clear that
where the treating physician's findings are supported by medically accept-
able evidence, the ALJ may not be required to utilize the six-factor Newton
analysis before giving less weight to the treating physician's findings, but no
analysis whatsoever will surely lead to a remand.
201. Id. at *19. The statements and reports of family members and teachers are evaluated under
the auspices of SSR 06-3p. See supra note 67.
202. Id. at *18 (citing Holifleld, 402 F. App'x 24, 27 (5th Cir. 2010)).
203. Id. at *21.
204. See also Gates v. Astrue, No. 3:10-cv-489-CWR-FKB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109324, at
*12-15 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 31, 2011) (citing where U.S. Magistrate Judge Keith Ball affirmed an ALJ's
grant of little weight to a treating source's opinion. Judge Ball held that where evidence in the form of
notes, tests, exams, etc. contradicts the treating physician's opinion, the regulation's multi-factor analy-
sis is not required so long as the ALJ offers explanations sufficient to establish good cause for the
rejection.).
205. No. 1:10CV060-SAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114768 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 27, 2010).
206. Id. at *9-10.
207. Id. at *15-16.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Voltaire famously observed that doctors "prescribe medicine of which
they know little, to cure diseases of which they know less, in human beings
of which they know nothing." Eighteenth century doctors almost certainly
bled George Washington to death, undoubtedly prompting Thomas Jeffer-
son to declare that whenever he saw three physicians together he cast his
eyes skyward to see whether a turkey buzzard was hovering nearby. In the
guise of Poor Richard, Benjamin Franklin quipped, "there's more old
drunkards than old doctors" and "he's a fool that makes his doctor his
heir."
Good revolutionary-era humor aside, advances in medical science
have so improved doctors' chances of adequately treating their patients
that there is now much truth in the old Jewish proverb: "Don't live in a
town where there are no doctors." Consequently, treating doctors are
nowadays assumed by the Social Security Administration to be the best
sources for information about their patients' medical impairments and how
those impairments affect their patients' functional capacities.
Unfortunately, many treating doctors, even the most highly qualified
specialists, know very little about the evidentiary requirements of the So-
cial Security disability process, and those CEs and state agency reviewing
physicians who do know a great deal about those requirements do not
know as much about the claimants' medical histories as do the treating
medical sources. It is up to the lawyers to educate treating doctors on SSA
evidentiary requirements, and it falls upon ALJs to appreciate fully the
treating doctor's greater understanding of their patients' conditions.
Happily for the disability adjudication process, Social Security regula-
tions, particularly 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927, provide considerable
guidance to lawyers, doctors, ALJs, and appellate judges regarding the
level of weight to be given to the various doctors' opinions adduced for the
medical record. Knowing this, there are several things ALJs and the attor-
neys practicing before them can do to better serve both the American pub-
lic and their clients, respectively.
Attorneys should familiarize themselves with these regulations before
undertaking to represent clients in disability hearings. Armed with the
knowledge of what evidence does and does not support disability findings,
lawyers may then take the time to explain the regulations to doctors treat-
ing their clients. In particular, they can explain to physicians that a doctor's
bald and unsupported statement that a claimant is disabled is practically
worthless, as such determinations are reserved to the Commissioner (ALJ),
while a doctor's letter or medical source statement explaining the claim-
ant's impairments and their severity (i.e., how they affect the claimant's
functioning, the degree to which the impairments affect the claimant's
functioning, and the supporting medically acceptable clinical, diagnostic,
and laboratory findings that document the doctor's opinions) is the most
helpful information doctors can provide to lawyers representing claimants
in disability cases.
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As a lawyer handling Social Security cases in the 1990s, I abjured
purchasing witless statements from doctors who knew nothing of either
their clients' functioning capacities or SSA evidentiary requirements, and I
took the time to explain the regulations pertaining to medical evidence to
my clients' medical providers. This approach is guaranteed to bring better
results for clients than merely approaching Social Security disability cases
as if they were just another kind of tort action in circuit court with doctors
familiar with evidentiary requirements. Not only will attorneys schooled in
the regulations, and the law interpreting those regulations, offer better rep-
resentation to their clients during hearings, they will also be in a better
position to recognize errors made by ALJs who failed to properly analyze
the medical opinions admitted into evidence.
Suffice it to say, ALJs handling disability hearings should be as well
versed in the regulations as priests and pastors are in the Bible. And while
I learned the regulations back and forth during the excellent judge training
afforded me by the agency, I never truly understood their practical applica-
tion until I took the time to read Fifth Circuit decisions such as Newton v.
Apfel and the decisions promulgated by Mississippi's magistrate judges that
often address numerous key issues (such as medical evidence, credibility,
vocational factors, etc.) in greater detail.
Regarding weight given to treating and other medical sources, the reg-
ulations and the Fifth Circuit decisions interpreting those regulations have
convinced me of three things. First, when a treating source offers a well-
supported opinion as to a claimant's disability and there is no contradictory
medical evidence in the form of examining or other treating source opin-
ions, I must either give that treating opinion controlling weight, or before I
decline to do so, I must engage in the analysis mandated by 20 C.F.R.
H§ 404.1527 and 416.927, with my best guide for that analysis being the in-
terpretations of those regulations by the Fifth Circuit in Newton and its
progeny.
Second, if medical evidence of record exists in the form of a contradic-
tory opinion rendered by another treating or examining physician and if I
choose not to give the treating physician controlling weight, I must still
consider how much weight to give the treating physician's opinion. I may
reject that opinion or choose to give the opinion of another treating or
examining physician greater weight without fully engaging in the Newton
analysis, so long as I provide a reasonably supportable explanation that
suffices as good cause to reject the treating opinion.
Third, even though contradictory, well-supported treating or other ex-
amining medical source opinions may suffice to allow me to reject the
treating source opinion without a lengthy Newton analysis, I may still risk
reversal if I do not utilize the best available guide for analyzing medical
source opinions, the aforesaid regulations, and the Newton six-factor test
for determining the weight I should give the treating physician's or psychol-
ogist's opinion.
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